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Ethiopia in the World Economy: 
Trade, Private Capital Flows, and Migration 
 
Abstract. Economic globalization can be evaluated with reference to at least three 
dimensions: trade, private capital flows, and migration. For each of these dimensions, 
pathways can be identified through which economic globalization can alleviate or 
contribute to poverty. This paper makes a preliminary examination of the pathways 
between globalization and poverty for the case of Ethiopia. As one of the world’s poorest 
countries, Ethiopia’s integration with the world economy takes on specific features. It is 
highly dependent on the exports of a few goods, has imported a large amount of arms, is 
largely excluded from global FDI flows, benefits from relatively large inflows of 
remittances, and is largely excluded from the evolving global regime of intellectual 
property. Despite a number of negative trends with regard to globalization and poverty, 
there is room for “small win” policies that would enhance the role of globalization in 
supporting poverty alleviation. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Economic globalization can be evaluated with reference to at least three dimensions: 
trade, private capital flows, and migration. For each of these dimensions, pathways can 
be identified through which economic globalization can help or hurt poor people. For 
example, exports of labor-intensive goods have the potential of supporting the incomes of 
poor people, but imports of armaments can have disastrous impacts, especially for poor 
children. Capital inflows in the form of FDI can enhance employment and technological 
learning, but unwise bond finance and commercial bank lending can precipitate crises 
with devastating effects for poor people.2 Sorting out the positive and negative impacts of 
increased globalization from the point of view of poor people is therefore of great 
importance. This paper attempts to do so using the particular circumstances of Ethiopia as 
a central reference point. 
                                                 
2
 As noted by Eichengreen (2004), an “average” or “typical” financial crisis can claim up to 9 
percent of GDP. Some of the worst crises, such as those in Argentina and Indonesia, reduced 
GDP by over 20 percent, declines greater than that which occurred in the United States during the 
Great Depression. This has particular relevance for potential capital account liberalization in 
African countries since, as noted by Singh (1999), banking sectors in this region are notoriously 
fragile. Additionally, as documented by Stiglitz (2001) and Wade (2001), Ethiopia has in the past 
been under pressure by the International Monetary Fund to liberalize its capital account. 
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 A few papers have taken up issues related to Ethiopia’s involvement in the 
process of globalization. These include Asefa and Lemi (2004), Dercon (2003), 
Ramakrishna (2002), Tessema (2003), and Bourguignon et al. (2004). This paper will try 
to place these studies in the wider context of the globalization-and-poverty research 
agenda. The economic challenges facing Ethiopia tend to lead the observer to conclude 
that little can be done to positively affect Ethiopia’s engagement with the global 
economic system. This paper will be somewhat more optimistic, suggesting that the 
strategy of a country such as Ethiopia in engaging the world economy is best engaged in 
terms of what Weick (1984) referred to as “small wins.”3 The paper will explore some 
potential small wins within Ethiopia’s grasp in order to identify specific strategies to 
make its globalization more pro-poor. 
 
2. Poverty 
The most common measure of poverty is income poverty, a deprivation of goods 
consumption due to a lack of necessary purchasing power. Measured in terms of 
purchasing power parity (PPP), gross national income (GNI) per capita in Ethiopia was 
just over US$700 in 2003 (up from approximately US$400 in 1985). Figure 1 compares 
GNI per capita in Ethiopia with that of two other transitional economies, namely South 
Africa and Vietnam. What stands out in this figure is the “flat” nature of per-capita 
income in Ethiopia over time in comparison to these two other countries.  
In the parlance of the World Bank, individuals who exist on less than one dollar a 
day (1985 purchasing power parity dollars) are known as the “extremely poor,” while 
individuals who exist on less than two dollars a day (1985 purchasing power parity 
dollars) are known as the “poor.”4 In the case of Ethiopia, figures on the “poor” and 
“extremely poor” are available for only the year 2000. They indicate that approximately 
one quarter of Ethiopia’s population is “extremely poor,” but that over three quarters of 
the population is “poor.”  
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 Weick (1984) noted that “Changing the scale of a problem can change the quality of resources 
that are directed at it. Calling a situation a mere problem that necessitates a small win moderates 
arousal, improves diagnosis, preserves gains, and encourages innovation” (p. 48). 
4
 See Chen and Ravallion (2004). 
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 There is a growing recognition that income poverty is not the only important 
measure of deprivation. With regard to health poverty, for example, infant and child 
mortality are key indicators. As is indicated in Figure 2, approximately one in six 
Ethiopian children do not live to age five. Again this figure compares Ethiopia with 
South Africa and Vietnam. While Ethiopia shows some improvement relative to South 
Africa, it falls far behind the gains of Vietnam where infant and child mortality was cut in 
half in 13 years. Short of mortality, a number of morbidity issues are of central concern 
for Ethiopia. For example, Christiaensen and Alderman (2004) refer to the “the sheer 
magnitude of child malnutrition in Ethiopia” (p. 288). In the case of stunting, for 
example, the rate is approximately 60 percent of all children, significantly above an 
average approximately 40 percent for sub-Saharan Africa.5 Bourguignon et al. (2004) 
also note that, while down from its 1990 level, the 2002 maternal mortality rate (per 
100,000 live births) was still over 600. 
Education poverty, including gender disparities, is important both in its own   
right, as well as a factor contributing to health poverty.6 The work of Bigsten et al. (2003) 
suggests that primary education does play an important role in translating growth into 
poverty reduction in Ethiopia, albeit more for the urban poor than the rural poor. 
Fortunately, it is here that we see a bit of good news. As presented in Figure 3, the gross 
primary enrollment ratio has been on a long-term, upward trend. More importantly, 
though, there has been a rapid increase in this enrollment ratio during the 1990s, with the 
2002 ratio being just under 62 percent.7 That said, however, as noted by Bourguignon et 
al. (2004), Ethiopia’s primary completion rate is below the average for sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
Whether from the perspectives of income, health, or education, poverty levels are 
of grave concern for Ethiopia. The orthodox view of the multilateral development 
institutions is that more domestic liberalization, growth, and globalization can help 
address this concern. Is this so? Dercon (2003) analyzes domestic liberalization and 
concludes that it is poverty alleviating overall, despite the fact that poor people in remote 
areas and with poor household endowments do not necessarily benefit. With regard to 
                                                 
5
 See also Silva (2005). 
6
 On gender disparities in education, see Schultz (2002). 
7
 The primary completion rate was just under 40 percent in 2003, up from 15 percent in 1993. 
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growth, Bourguignon et al. (2004) note that: “While the linkage between income growth 
and income poverty reduction is quite tight, so that high growth leads to significant 
reductions in income poverty, improvements in the other (human development measures 
are are) not readily achieved from growth alone” (pp. 1-2). With regard to globalization 
more broadly, we consider trade, private capital flows, and migration in the remainder of 
this paper. 
 
3. Trade 
Of all aspects of globalization, it is international trade that is held out as the great hope 
for poverty alleviation.8 Trade can contribute to poverty alleviation by expanding 
markets, promoting competition, and raising productivity, each of which has the potential 
to increase the real incomes of poor people. But, as the recent histories of a number of 
countries demonstrate, it would be a mistake to rely on trade liberalization alone as a 
means of reducing poverty.9 A more comprehensive approach is needed that addresses 
multiple economic and social challenges simultaneously and that emphasizes the 
expansion of poor people’s capabilities, especially in the areas of health and education.10 
Nevertheless, trade has some vital roles to play. 
International trade is a means of expanding markets, and market expansion can 
help to generate employment and incomes for poor people. Comparisons are often made 
between the wages of workers in poor-country export industries and the wages of 
workers in developed countries. In these comparisons, the wages of workers in 
developing-country export industries often appear to be very low. Consequently, trade 
has often been identified as poverty worsening. However, the more relevant comparison 
is between what people may have earned before and after trade opportunities were made 
available. From a poverty perspective, this could be between the wages of export sector 
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 See Dollar and Kraay (2004), for example. An alternative view is given in Rodríquez and 
Rodrik (2001). A thorough review of trade and poverty is provided by Winters, McCulloch, and 
McKay (2004). 
9
 The fact that the trade-poverty alleviation linkage is not automatic has been stressed by 
UNCTAD (2004) in the case of the least-developed countries. 
10
 Oxfam (2002a) notes that “In itself, trade is not inherently opposed to the interests of poor 
people. International trade can be a force for good, or for bad… The outcomes are not pre-
determined. They are shaped by the way in which international trade relations are managed, and 
by national policies” (p. 28). 
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workers with agricultural day laborers, both in the same developing country. Here it can 
often be seen that it is the alternative of agricultural day labor that is much worse. It is 
precisely this type of income comparison that draws workers into export industries.11  
It must be kept in mind that not all export activity is equal from the point of view 
of raising the income of poor people. Exporting can best contribute to poverty alleviation 
when it supports labor-intensive production, human capital accumulation (both education 
and health), and technological learning. In addition, the incomes of poor individuals 
depend on buoyant and sustainable export incomes, which in turn are dependent on 
export prices.  
 International trade is also a means of promoting competition, and in many 
instances, this can help poor people. Increased competition lowers the real costs of both 
consumption and production. For example, domestic monopolies charge monopoly prices 
that can be significantly above competitive prices. The competition introduced by imports 
erodes market power, lowering prices. These pro-competitive effects of trade can make 
tight household budgets go farther and lower costs of production. The latter can have 
knock-on employment effects advantageous to poor individuals by lowering non-wage 
costs in labor-intensive production activities. Pro-competitive effects can also arise in the 
case of monopsony power. Here, sellers (small farmers, for example) to the monopsony 
buyer are able to obtain higher prices for their goods as the buying power of the 
monopsonist is eroded. 
 There is some evidence that international trade can promote productivity in a 
country, and it is possible that productivity increases can in turn support the incomes of 
poor people.12 It is not the case that exports of all types or in all countries generate 
positive productivity effects, but there is evidence that this is the case in certain instances. 
Export postures can place the exporting firms in direct contact with discerning 
international customers, facilitating upgrading processes. There is no consensus within 
international economics on the extent of these upgrading effects, but they nonetheless 
remain an important possibility including in natural resource intensive sectors.13 
                                                 
11
 On the case of Bangladesh, for example, see Zohir (2001) and Oxfam (2002a).  
12
 For a review of the evidence on trade liberalization and productivity, see Winters, McCulloch, 
and McKay (2004). 
13
 On the latter, see de Ferranti et al. (2002). 
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 There are occasions where international trade can have direct health and safety 
impacts on poor individuals, impacts that can be beneficial or detrimental. Perhaps most 
importantly, improving the health outcomes of poor people usually involves imports of 
medical products. It is simply not possible for a small, developing country like Ethiopia 
to produce the entire range of even some of the more basic medical supplies, no less more 
advanced medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. However, many developing counties 
import large amounts of weaponry and export sexual services, both of which can have 
dramatically negative outcomes for the health and safety of poor individuals.14 In 
addition, the production processes of some export industries can adversely affect the 
health of workers in those industries, and a small but important amount of trade involves 
hazardous waste dumping. 
Ethiopia has increased its involvement in international trade, although less rapidly 
than other countries. Figure 4 plots the standard measure of the sum of exports and 
imports as a percent of GDP for Ethiopia, South Africa and Vietnam. Note that, in the 
mid-1980s, Ethiopia was slightly more engaged in trading activities than Vietnam, 
whereas in the most recent years, its total trade is less than half of Vietnam’s, measured 
as a percent of GDP. In comparison with South Africa, however, Ethiopia has slowly 
achieved parity in this measure of trade openness. 
Ethiopia’s export profile is presented in Figure 5. What is immediately clear from 
this figure is Ethiopia’s dependence on coffee exports. Primary commodity dependence 
of this sort has a number of drawbacks from the point of view of poverty alleviation. First 
is the secular, downward trend in commodity prices. Second is the escalating protection 
in primary commodity markets in developed countries.15 Third is the monopsonistic 
pricing along commodity chains practiced by major coffee multinationals.16 This 
dependence problem was apparent as coffee export revenues fell by over US$100 million 
between 1999 and 2001 as coffee prices fell to a 30-year low. As noted by Oxfam 
(2002b), this decline in export revenues more than offset the debt relief Ethiopia obtained 
                                                 
14
 This point is emphasized by Reinert (2004). 
15
 To be fair, as noted by Oxfam (2002), “import tariffs into rich-country markets are not the main 
barrier for most coffee proucers” (p. 33). 
16
 This issue was raised some time ago by Brown and Tiffen (1992) and more recently in the case 
of coffee by Oxfam (2002b). In the case of coffee, the main players are Kraft, Nestlé, Procter & 
Gamble, and Sara Lee. See also Talbot (2002). 
 7 
from the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, and many Ethiopian coffee 
farmers have been forced to shift to the production of chat, a stimulant used in the region 
around the Red Sea. 
We must be careful in interpreting data such as presented in Figure 5, however. 
Such descriptions exclude services trade, which is significant for Ethiopia. Figure 6 plots 
commercial service exports as a percent of total exports. This has been on a steady, if 
somewhat volatile, upward trend, reaching nearly half of total exports in 2002. As any 
passenger on Ethiopian Airlines will appreciate, the bulk of this service exports is 
accounted for by transportation services. It is therefore important to consider the full 
range of Ethiopia’s trade engagement, not the traditional, commodity-only view. 
Despite the pressing human development needs of the poorest countries such as 
Ethiopia, arms imports have at times composed a significant part of its total imports and 
government military expenditures a significant part of total government expenditures. 
This is illustrated for various years (determined by data availability) in Figure 7. The 
vertical bars in this figure plot government military expenditures as a percent of total 
government expenditures. For the years in which data are available, this ranged from just 
over 20 percent to nearly 55 percent. The line in Figure 7 plots arms imports in constant, 
1990 US dollars. This peaked in 1998 at approximately US$200 million but has 
composed up to one fifth of total imports at times. Such trade cannot be conceived of as 
poverty alleviating. Indeed, in the case of Ethiopia (and Eritrea), it has been nothing less 
than a catastrophe, and it is difficult to conceive of a more perverse role for trade than in 
facilitating the death and injury of the very people it should be benefiting.17 
 
4. Private Capital Flows 
Private capital flows are an important resource for developing countries. Capital flows 
augment domestic savings and can contribute to investment, growth, financial sector 
development, technology transfer, and poverty reduction. However, there is also 
substantial evidence that capital flows entail potential costs that are both much larger than 
in the case of trade and disproportionately carried by the poor. Additionally, it has 
                                                 
17
 The author cannot resist relating the observation of an individual from the region that the 
border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been like “two bald men fighting over a comb.” 
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become clear that not all capital flows are the same in their benefit and cost 
characteristics. For these reasons, a careful assessment of the impact of capital flows on 
poverty does not lend itself to across-the-board statements. Rather, the cost and benefit 
characteristics of distinct types of capital flows must be considered in some detail. Here 
we distinguish among foreign direct investment, equity portfolio investment, bond 
finance, and commercial bank lending. 
The financial markets involved in equity portfolio investment, bond finance, and 
commercial bank lending are characterized by a number of market failures. In normal 
circumstances, these imperfections tend to contribute to a certain amount of market 
volatility.  Under certain circumstances that are not fully understood (but are particularly 
important in emerging economies such as Ethiopia), they can lead to full-blown financial 
crises. Imperfections in financial markets appear to be particularly problematic when 
commercial banks in developing countries are given access to short-term, foreign lending 
sources.18 The resulting problems have three causes. First, systems of financial 
intermediation in developing countries tend to rely heavily on the banking sector, other 
types of financial intermediation typically being underdeveloped. Second, developing 
countries have been encouraged to liberalize domestic financial markets, sometimes 
before systems of prudential bank regulation and management are put in place. Third, 
developing countries have sometimes prematurely liberalized their capital accounts.19 
Consequently, care must be taken in managing evolving financial systems and their 
access to international capital flows. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment can have positive impacts on poverty by creating 
employment, improving technology and human capital, and promoting competition. Not 
all kinds of FDI contribute in this way, however, and some can adversely impact certain 
                                                 
18
 The World Bank (2001) notes that “If finance is fragile, banking is the most fragile part” (p. 
11). 
19
 For a critique of premature capital account liberalization, see Stiglitz, (2000). As the World 
Bank (2001) notes, “Poor sequencing of financial liberalization in a poor country environment 
has undoubtedly contributed to bank insolvency” (p. 89). Hanson, Honohan, and Majnoni (2003) 
also note that “the riskiness of capital account liberalization without fiscal adjustment… and 
without reasonably strong financial regulation and supervision and a sound domestic financial 
system, is well recognized” (p. 10). On pressures for premature capital account liberalization in 
Ethiopia, see Stiglitz (2001) and Wade (2001). 
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dimensions of poverty through unsafe working conditions and environmental 
degradation. Nevertheless, if we were to identify the most promising category of capital 
flows from the point of view of poverty alleviation, FDI would be it.20 
Many developing countries lack access to the technologies available in developed 
countries, and hosting MNEs from developed countries is one way to potentially gain 
access to that technology. There are limits to technology transfer, however. First, MNEs 
will employ the technology that most suits their strategic needs and not the development 
needs of host countries. For example, MNEs can employ processes that are much more 
capital intensive than would be desired on the basis of host-country employment 
considerations.21 Second, there is a strong tendency for MNEs to conduct their research 
and development in their home bases rather than in host countries.22   
Despite these general limitations, in some important cases, MNEs do transfer 
technology and establish significant relationships with host-country suppliers via 
backward linkages. If foreign MNE begins to source inputs locally rather than by 
importing them, the host country can gain a number of important benefits. First, 
employment can increase since the sourced inputs represent new production. Second, 
production technologies can be better adapted to local conditions since suppliers are more 
likely to employ labor-intensive processes. Third, the MNE can transfer state-of-the-art 
business practices and technologies to the local suppliers. Fourth, it is possible that the 
local suppliers can coalesce into a spatial cluster that supports innovation and 
upgrading.23  
                                                 
20
 The present paper is in broad agreement with Singh (1999) that “The experience of many Asian 
and Latin American countries with portfolio capital flows… indicate that the African countries 
would benefit from using their efforts and institutional resources to attract FDI rather than 
portfolio flows” (p. 356). It does, however, distinguish between portfolio flows in the form of 
equity investment and those in the form of bond finance, with a preference for the former. 
21
 Caves (1996) noted that “Survey evidence indicates that MNEs do some adapting (of 
technologies to labor-abundant conditions), but not a great deal, and it appears that the costs of 
adaptation commonly are high relative to the benefits expected by individual companies” (p. 
241). 
22
 Dunning (1993) noted that “With the exception of some European-based companies, the 
proportion of R&D activity by MNEs undertaken outside their home countries is generally quite 
small and, in the case of Japanese firms, negligible” (p. 301). 
23
 For the role of clusters in natural resource-based development, such as might be important to 
Ethiopia, see Ramos (1998). 
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Another avenue through which MNEs can positively affect host economies is 
through “spillovers” to other sectors of these economies. The evidence to date suggests 
that such spillovers do occur in some circumstances and can be significant. However, in 
the words of Blomström and Sjöholm (1999), they are not “guaranteed, automatic, or 
free.” What determines whether positive technology spillovers will occur? Many factors 
are involved, and these include host country policies, MNE behavior, and industry 
characteristics. One key factor is the capacity of local firms to absorb foreign 
technologies. Blomström and Kokko (2003) suggest that learning is a key capacity that is 
responsive to various host country policies, and evidence presented in Tsang, Nguyen and 
Erramilli (2004) in the case of Vietnam support this view.  
 There is some evidence that MNEs in Africa offer higher wages than domestic 
firms.24 This effect is more predominant for skilled than unskilled workers. FDI can 
therefore have differential impacts that exclude unskilled workers. This can result in what 
te Velde (2001) refers to as the “low-income low-skill trap.” All of these considerations 
point to the role of basic education and skills development in making the most of FDI for 
poverty alleviation.25 
 The low-income countries as a whole are largely excluded from global FDI flows. 
For example, in 2002, low-income countries received only two percent of total FDI 
flows, with nearly half of this going to India and Vietnam alone. Figure 8 compares 
Ethiopia with South Africa and Vietnam and illustrates the fact that, with the exception of 
a few years in the late 1990s, FDI flows into Ethiopia have been nearly non-existent. This 
poses a serious challenge to the country. As we discuss below, the country might be able 
to make better use of its diaspora to stimulate inflows of FDI, since these individuals will 
be better able to overcome information gaps regarding the investment climate in the 
country. A regional approach to FDI under the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) is another possibility. 
                                                 
24
 See te Velde and Morrissey (2003). 
25
 Borenszteirn, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) find that it is the combination of FDI and education 
that has a statistically significant impact on growth. 
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Equity Portfolio Investment 
There is evidence that capital inflows in the form of equity portfolio investment 
might be more beneficial than both bond finance and commercial bank lending. For 
example, Reisen and Soto (2001) have examined the impact of all four capital inflows 
considered here on growth for a sample of 44 countries. They found that FDI, considered 
above, did indeed have a positive impact on economic growth. The most positive growth 
impact, however, came from equity portfolio flows. Bond finance, considered below, did 
not have any impact on growth, and commercial bank lending, also considered below, 
had a negative impact. These results suggest that equity inflows, along with FDI, could 
play an especially positive role in growth, development, and poverty alleviation.  
Why can equity portfolio investment play a positive role in growth and 
development, at least under some circumstances? Rouseau and Wachtel (2000) 
summarize research on this question with four possibilities: equity portfolio inflows are 
an important source of funds for developing countries; the development of equity markets 
helps to provide an exit mechanism for venture capitalists, and this increases 
entrepreneurial activity; portfolio inflows assist developing countries to move from short-
term finance to longer-term finance and help to finance investment in projects that have 
economies of scale; the development of equity markets provides an informational 
mechanism evaluating the performance of domestic firms and can help provide incentives 
to managers to perform well. 
With regard to volatility, there is some evidence that institutional investors 
managing equity flows are less likely than banks to engage in herd and contagion 
behavior.26 However, in general, equity markets are underdeveloped in much of the 
developing world. For example, nearly the entire net portfolio equity inflows into Sub-
Saharan Africa are accounted for by one country alone: South Africa. The World Bank 
(2004) summarized the features of developing-country equity markets as follows: 
Market capitalization as a share of GDP in low-income countries is about 
one-sixth of that in high-income countries…. Stock exchanges in 
developing countries also tend to lag technologically behind developed 
markets. Technology plays a major role in the trading, clearance, and 
                                                 
26
 This evidence is reviewed in Chapter 1 of Dobson and Hufbauer (2001). Singh (1999), to some 
extent at least, contests this conclusion.  
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settlement processes; problems in those areas can discourage sophisticated 
investors. Institutions that supervise and support the operation of the stock 
exchange also tend to be weaker in developing countries (p. 95). 
 
The development of equity markets in low- and middle-income countries is more 
complex than it might first appear, however. This is due to the increased globalization of 
financial services. Observers have pointed to a set of domestic factors as being 
particularly important in equity market development. These factors include sound 
macroeconomic policies, minimal degrees of technology, legal systems that protect 
shareholders, and open financial markets. However, as pointed out by Claessens, 
Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2002), these are precisely the factors that tend to promote the 
“migration” of equity exchange out of developing countries to the major exchanges in 
financial capital of developed countries. This migration process complicates standard 
notions of equity market development. Steil (2002) has argued that the way forward is to 
link local markets with global markets. However, there might remain medium-sized firms 
with local information needs that could benefit from some kind of domestic equity 
market. This is an area that requires urgent attention for the development of novel 
approaches. 
At present, inflows of equity investment into Ethiopia are essentially non-existent. 
As in the case of FDI, then, this represents a significant challenge to Ethiopian 
policymakers. We take up this challenge below. 
Bond Finance and Commercial Bank Lending 
In the minds of the financial world, there are significant differences between 
portfolio equity investment and debt. This shows up in the fact that, in the case of 
bankruptcy, debt is given priority over equity. This tends to support the preference for 
debt over equity in markets, a preference that appears to be misplaced from a 
development and poverty alleviation perspective. At present, inflows of bond finance into 
Ethiopia are non-existent. From a poverty perspective, this is not a cause of great concern 
at present. Greater benefits would be attained from increases in FDI and equity portfolio 
inflows. 
With regard to commercial bank lending, Dobson and Hufbauer (2001) note that 
“Bank lending may be more prone to run than portfolio capital, because banks themselves 
 13 
are highly leveraged, and they are relying on the borrower’s balance sheet to ensure 
repayment” (p. 47). The World Bank (2001) notes that “Incentives are key to limiting 
undue risk-taking and fraudulent behavior in the management and supervision of 
financial intermediaries—especially banks that are prone to costly failure” (p. 3).  
What can be done to support the safe development of banking sectors in low-
income countries such as Ethiopia? Some of the necessary steps can be thought of in 
terms of information, institutions, and incentives. With regard to information, it is 
important for banks to embrace internationally-sanctioned accounting and auditing 
procedures and to make the results of these assessments available to the public. In the 
case of institutions or the rules of the “banking game,” risk management practices (both 
credit and currency) must be sufficiently stringent, and prudential regulation systems 
must be well developed. With regard to currency risk, the World Bank (2004) notes that 
“particular care should be taken to ensure that foreign-currency liabilities are 
appropriately hedged” (p. 30).27 These information and institutional safeguards are no 
small task and inevitably cannot be achieved in the short term. Consequently, they should 
be buttressed with incentive measures in the form of market-friendly taxes on banking 
capital inflows.  
To summarize, debt flows in the form of bond finance and commercial bank 
lending appear to have different properties than equity flows in the form of FDI and 
portfolio equity investment. They are more prone to the imperfect behaviors that 
characterize financial markets and do not appear to have positive growth effects as large 
as those associated with equity flows. Consequently, utilization of debt finance must be 
cautious and sufficiently hedged against exchange rate risks. 
 
                                                 
27
 Mistakes made in these areas have proved to be too costly to the poor in the past for countries 
to relax their vigilance. Prasad et al. (2003) conclude that: “The relative importance of different 
sources of financing for domestic investment, as proxied by the following three variables, has 
been shown to be positively associated with the incidence and the severity of currency and 
financial crises: the ratio of bank borrowing or other debt relative to foreign direct investment; the 
shortness of the term structure of external debt; and the share of external debt denominated in 
foreign currencies” (p. 49).  
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5. Migration 
Historical analysis demonstrates that international migration can offer an effective means for 
poor people to escape poverty, while promoting economic growth and technological 
progress.28 Communities can be lifted out of poverty via remittance flows from the 
country’s diaspora. Also, when migrants are successful in business endeavors, the diaspora 
can become involved in trade and capital flow networks that facilitate market access, 
investment, and technology transfer. That said, however, migration can also be devastating 
to those left behind. Migrants can take with them critical skills, especially in the area of 
health. Further, the loss of household heads, innovators, and social leaders can cause a broad 
array of costs, including to social cohesion. As stated by OECD (2005), “emigration of 
highly skilled workers may adversely affect small countries by preventing them reaching a 
critical mass of human resources, which would be necessary to foster long-term economic 
development.” Since highly-skilled workers tend to generate the largest share of tax 
revenues, emigration can also have detrimental impacts on the tax base, with knock-on 
effects in the areas of public services and infrastructure. Some governments have attempted 
to offset these losses by taxing remittance inflows, but these attempts are not generally 
successful.29 The net impact of migration on source countries is therefore uncertain. 
 The loss of high-skilled workers is a significant issue for Ethiopia. Migrating 
involves incurring private costs that can be significant. Consequently, migration rates 
tend to be higher for high-skilled individuals who can better overcome these costs.30 
African countries have been hard hit in this process of “brain drain,” and Ethiopia has not 
escaped this phenomenon. For example, El-Khawas (2004) points out that there are more 
Ethiopian doctors in Europe and North America than in Ethiopia. More generally, Aredo 
(1998) estimated that, between 1968/69 and 1995/96, more than one third of Ethiopian 
students who went abroad for graduate study did not return. As pointed out by Beath, 
Goldin, and Reinert (2006), a brain drain does increase the rate of return to education. 
However, since the skills lost are often crucial ones, it seems unlikely that this would 
offset the losses involved in the Ethiopian case. The Ethiopian government, having 
                                                 
28
 This section draws on Beath, Goldin, and Reinert (2006). 
29
 See Lowell (2001). 
30
 See, for example, Carrington and Detragiache (1999). 
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hosted the Regional Conference on Brain Drain and Capacity Building in 2000, is 
obviously aware of these problems.  
 On the positive side, Ethiopia receives a significant amount of remittances from its 
migrants. In discussions of globalization and poverty, the role of remittances is often 
underestimated. Figure 10 plots Ethiopia’s remittances as a percent of FDI inflows. As this 
figure demonstrates, though smaller, remittances are on the same order of magnitude as FDI, 
even reaching over 90 percent of FDI in 2001. As empirically demonstrated by Aredo 
(2005), Ethiopians use remittance income as a risk-sharing mechanism for self insurance 
against shocks of various kinds.31 A key challenge for the country, then, is to make better 
use of these remittance flows, while harnessing the diaspora for increased FDI flows. We 
address these issues below. 
 
6. “Small Win” Policy Recommendations 
Globalization does not represent a panacea for the poor citizens of low-income countries 
like Ethiopia. However, it is worthwhile to inquire into whether there are any opportunities 
for what Weick (1984) referred to as “small wins” via policy changes and endeavors. It must 
first be said that the most important policies are in the area of universal primary education 
and the fight against infectious diseases. For example, Silva (2005) has identified the 
externalities associated with basic environmental services such as water and sanitation on 
child malnutrition in Ethiopia, and health advances can be made by training that falls 
short of fully-certified doctors and nurses.32 With regard to globalization, however, we 
consider some policy recommendations for trade, capital flows, and migration, 
respectively. 
International Trade 
 The trade challenge facing Ethiopia from the point of view of poverty alleviation 
is to promote labor-intensive exports in order to support a widely-dispersed expansion of 
incomes. This will not occur through an automatic comparative advantage process, and it 
is more productive to think in terms of potential competitive advantages in narrow 
product categories. It is also important to be alert to any potential cluster effects among 
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 Similar evidence for risk sharing was found in the case of Mali by Gubert (2002). 
32
 See Dugger (2004). This has the advantage of preventing brain drain of health-sector personnel. 
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these product categories. For example, Ethiopia’s export profile suggests that it is 
possible to think about the emergence of cotton products and leather clusters. Given the 
success of the African Cotton Initiative in the World Trade Organization dispute 
settlement process, the future of cotton might be brighter than in the past. With the right 
marketing and documentation, Ethiopia has potential in organic cotton product niches in 
Europe and the United States. More generally, it could be possible to take advantage of 
China’s increase in demand for cotton that is accompanying its rapidly-expanding 
clothing exports. With regard to leather products, the presence of the COMESA Leather 
and Leather Products Institute (LLPI) in Addis is a positive sign. Such institutes are often 
at the center of emerging clusters. With regard to both cotton and leather products, the 
Ethiopian Ministry of Trade and Industry’s involvement in the 2004 UNIDO workshop 
on these two sectors is a very positive step, particularly with regard to the strengthening 
of the leather supply chain.33 
In the case of coffee, the promotion of “fair trade” certification would ensure the 
maximum value for developing country producers in the face of export price declines.34 
For example, as noted by Oxfam (2002b), “At the Oromiya Coffee Farmers Cooperative 
Union in Ethiopia, farmers can get 70 percent of the export price for coffee that sells as 
Fair Trade, while those in the Jimma zone of Ethiopia’s Kafa province, selling in the 
open market, get only 30 percent” (p. 41). Given the magnitude of the coffee crisis, it is 
difficult to disagree with Oxfam’s assessment that “whether or not Fair Trade can be 
applied in the mainstream, the lack of alternatives and the absence of government safety 
nets for poor producers make this sort of support to farmers an entirely justifiable and 
appropriate attempt to cope with the human cost of the rigors of the free market” (p. 42). 
Expansion of fair trade opportunities for Ethiopia’s coffee farmers is therefore a key 
priority, especially in light of the difficulties outlined by Talbot (2002) in attempting 
forward integration along the coffee commodity chain.35 Although forward integration 
                                                 
33
 UNIDO is also supporting the role of Ethiopia in the International Network for Bamboo and 
Rattan (INBAR), and this could also have some future promise. 
34
 See Raynolds (2000) and references therein.  
35
 Given the nature of coffee production, the only real room for forward integration is into instant 
coffee production. 
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along the tea commodity chain is easier than for coffee, promoting fair trade 
opportunities for the expanding tea sector is also important. 
 The movement of natural persons (WTO Mode 4 of services trade) offers large 
potential benefits to a country such as Ethiopia. While Ethiopia is not a member of the 
WTO, it needs to make as much use of this services trade mode as possible through 
bilateral arrangements. As Winters et al. (2002) have shown, the gains for developing 
countries from an increase of only 3 percent in their temporary labor quotas would 
exceed the value of total aid flows and be similar to the expected benefits from the Doha 
Round of trade negotiations, with most of the benefits to developing countries coming 
from increased access of unskilled workers to jobs in developed countries.36  
 Ethiopia’s export of tourist services remains largely untapped, and the potential 
for cultural tourism and ecotourism is great, especially so given the country’s airline and 
its diaspora’s involvement in travel agencies. In a related area, Ethiopia is largely 
excluded from the evolving global regime of trade-related, intellectual property. The 
government needs to follow the lead of India and begin to construct a Traditional 
Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) containing a formal inventory of all cultural property 
that its citizens might exploit in the future.37 This is important to prevent future theft of 
the country’s cultural patrimony. One important area is that of music copyright, but there 
are others as well.38 
As has been recently noted by a number of researchers, developing countries play 
a role in trade as nodes in global production networks (GPNs).39 GPNs refer to refers to 
the process whereby the production of a final good having previously taken place in a 
single country is broken down into a number of discrete steps each taking place in 
different countries. The evolution of GPNs has responded to: technological progress in 
transportation, technological progress in communications, technological progress in data 
processing, reduced restrictions on FDI inflows, and trade liberalization. As noted by the 
                                                 
36
 As pointed out by Puri (2002), there is an important gender element here: “For the majority of 
women, Mode 4 provides the only opportunity to obtain remunerative employment with 
temporary movement to provide services abroad. It has been found to have a net positive effect 
on the economy and poverty reduction in the home country” (p. 8). 
37
 See Sahai (2003) and Das (2006), for example. 
38
 The contributions to Silverman (1999) are relevant in this regard. 
39
 See, for example, Bair and Gereffi (2001), Clancy (1998), Henderson et al. (2002), and World 
Bank (2003). 
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World Bank (2003), to date, Africa has been largely left out of this important 
globalization process, and UNCTAD (2002) has questioned the benefits involved in GPN 
participation. It is not clear whether Ethiopia will achieve the necessary policy and 
infrastructure prerequisites to be a potential GPN participant, but sustained trade-related 
capacity building supported by multilateral financial institutions could potentially change 
this. 
Capital Flows 
Both the Ethiopian government and the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce 
have investigated the possibility of organizing an equities exchange.40 This is no small 
endeavor. Although the presence and upgrading of the Nairobi equities exchange in 
Kenya indicates that it might be possible, the first priority with regard to capital flows 
would be to ensure the prudential regulation of the emerging banking sector, with care 
given to strenuously conditioning its borrowing in foreign currencies. Given this first 
step, one possibility would be to link any nascent exchange to the one in Johannesburg in 
order to tap into existing technology. More realistic still would be to give serious 
consideration to the suggestion of Mwenda and Muuka (2001) for cooperation within 
COMESA to form a regional equity market in order to promote multiple listings and 
cross-border equity investments. Given the liquidity requirements of equity exchanges, 
this would appear to be a wise option. 
With regard to direct investment, the Ethiopia Investment Authority (EIA) could 
make better use of the country’s foreign population in order to better facilitate FDI flows. 
In addition, it makes sense to tightly link the EIA to the proposed COMESA Regional 
Investment Agency. As discussed above, it is simply a characteristic of modern, global 
production that it involves international and regional networks. Attempting to “go it 
alone” with regard to investment projects is therefore shortsighted.  
Migration41 
Improving the benefits of migration includes strengthening the financial 
infrastructure supporting remittances. New e-commerce technologies, including in 
foreign exchange markets and in electronic cards, offer great potential to reduce the 
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 See Tessema (2003). 
41
 Some of the suggestions here draw from Beath, Goldin, and Reinert (2006). 
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overall transactions costs. The availability of accessible remittance services in expatriate 
communities and near the destination of the people to whom the funds are to be 
transferred, which offer simple processes in languages understood by the migrants, can 
greatly facilitate remittance flows. It will also encourage the movement of remittances 
from unofficial and unregulated networks into regulated flows, which is important to 
address security as well as poverty concerns. Before recommending tax measures, official 
savings associations, and other government-led mechanisms to increase the beneficial 
impact of remittances, care must be taken to ensure that these will be welcomed by the 
diaspora itself. Otherwise, they will reduce their remittances or revert to unofficial 
channels.   
To some degree, governments can influence the decisions of skilled people to 
leave and to keep their capital in the country by shaping the overall environment for 
skilled people, by providing a safe and secure working environment, by reaching out to 
skilled people, and seeking their involvement in decision making. However, given the 
gaps in earning power and the attractions of cosmopolitan environments, this holding 
power is limited, particularly for poor countries such as Ethiopia. Some countries have 
also implemented programs to better direct remittances into development-oriented 
investments. For example, the Mexican government has assisted Mexican emigrants in 
establishing “Home-Town Associations” that support infrastructure and enterprise in 
home communities and “Economic Development Funds” in which contributions are 
matched by the Mexican government. This effort has spawned similar policies by El 
Salvador and its emigrant community.42  
Within the context of the African continent, the South African Network of Skills 
Abroad (SANSA) offers a model for harnessing the skills of expatriates.43 A primary 
purpose of SANSA is to gather information about expatriate South Africans in order to 
assess how their skills can be best matched to local needs. Modes of contribution by 
expatriates include: participation in training programs, technology transfer activities, 
                                                 
42
 See Stalker (2001). As pointed out by Kiggundu and Oni (2004), Ethiopia did benefit for some 
time from the International Migration Organization’s Return and Reintegration of Qualified 
African Nationals (RQAN). It has been some time, however, since this program has been in 
existence. 
43
 SANSA is a joint project of the South African National Research Foundation and Department 
of Science and Technology. 
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research result dissemination, and facilitation of business contacts and development.44 
Since both South Africa and Ethiopia share the characteristic of having diasporas 
concentrated in relatively few countries, the SANSA model holds out some promises for 
Ethiopia and could perhaps be replicated. For example, highly-skilled migrants could be 
tracked through a data bank and catalogued for future consultation assignments. This 
data-gathering exercise could be achieved through voluntary, web-based registration, 
passenger surveys on Ethiopian Airlines, and inquiries by embassy staff.45 
 
7. Summary 
While globalization is not a panacea, there are aspects of Ethiopia’s trade, capital flows, 
and migration where “small win” policy changes can be made that would have beneficial 
impacts for its poor citizens. Trade, FDI, and migration can be harnessed in a synergistic 
manner to deliver at least of modicum of benefits from the inevitable process of 
globalization the country confronts. Leveraging fair trade and promoting natural resource 
clusters can provide potential gains in export expansions. Of all capital flows, it is FDI 
and equities that hold the most promise with regard to long-term poverty reduction. 
Ethiopia should give serious consideration to regional efforts within COMESA both with 
regard to a Regional Investment Agency and with regard to the development of a regional 
equities exchange. To prevent future crises, prudential regulation of commercial banking 
is also a priority. As a country with a large diaspora containing highly-trained and 
motivated individuals, it must exploit the potential of this network. This is particularly 
the case because the country’s unusual position in air transportation services can 
effectively tie it into this network. 
 In two respects, the focus of this paper is too narrow. First, as the work of 
Bourguignon et al. (2004) makes clear, progress on an inclusive set of poverty measures 
in Ethiopia will depend on foreign resources not just in the form of private trade incomes, 
capital inflows, and remittances, but in the form of public or quasi-public foreign aid. 
Properly securing and managing these flows is crucial for poverty reduction but involves 
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 See http://sansa.nrf.ac.za and Kaplan (1997) for further information. 
45
 The Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association is already involved in such 
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yet another set of considerations beyond the scope of this paper. Second, any amount of 
“small win” policy changes in Ethiopia, important as they are, will not change the 
external environment that remains, in many crucial respects, antagonistic to the success 
of low-income countries. Protectionism, agricultural subsidies, inappropriately-defined 
protection of intellectual property, and resistance to the temporary movement of labor-
intensive service providers all remain a constraints to success. For these reasons, the 
challenges facing Ethiopia are numerous indeed. 
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Figure 2 Under Five Mortality Rate (per 1,000 population) 
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Figure 3 Gross Primary Enrollment Ratio (percent of relevant age group) 
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Figure 4 Total Trade as a Percent of GDP (percent) 
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Figure 5 Ethiopia’s Exports by Product Group, 2003 (percent and US$ million) 
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Figure 6 Commercial Service Exports as a Percent of Total (percent) 
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Figure 7 Arms Imports as a Percent of Total Imports, 1999 (percent) 
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Figure 8 Net Foreign Direct Investment as a Percent of GDP (percent) 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
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Figure 9 Foreign Remittances (current US$ millions) 
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Figure 10 Foreign Remittances as a Percent of FDI (percent) 
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